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Essay
THE DEVELOPMENT OF REALISM IN
LAW AND LITERATURE DURING THE
PERIOD 1883-1933: THE CULTURAL
RESEMBLANCE*
JAMES D. HOPKINSt
[The Editors of Pace Law Review have received a literary work
retrouv6. After fifty years of repose in its author's library, this
piece re-emerges as an enlightening historical perspective. We
are pleased to present this archetype of legal and literary intel-
lectualism, fittingly published in this volume of distinguished
scholars.]
In our culture the literary artist occupies a somewhat anom-
alous position. By a certain few the author is regarded as an in-
terpreter and, indeed, a creator of ideological movements; at the
least, a significant telltale as to the march of ideas within soci-
ety. By a vast majority he is conceived of as more a court jester,
with cap and bells, earning his pay with amusing stories and
glinting wit; or even more darkly as a parasite obtaining suste-
nance without giving in return any comparable contribution to
society. An artist, it is thought, is not a practical man. As the
Beards put it: "And by way of reciprocity practical men are
sometimes wont to speak of artists and writers as mere luxuries
(frightfully near the lunatic fringe) to be tolerated in the name
* The term "literature" is used at times in a broad meaning of writing in general.
Thus, a letter or a patent medicine advertisement may be equally thought of as
literature. No such meaning is intended here; rather, literature means simply fiction.
t 1931, Columbia College; 1933, Columbia Law School; 1962-1981, Justice, Appellate
Division 2d Dep't, Supreme Court of New York; 1982-1983, Acting Dean, Pace Univer-
sity School of Law.
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of respectability."1
The lawyer, despite his training in the printed word, has not
escaped the tendency to treat the literary man with gentle dis-
dain. That he deals with fact, and the artist with pure fancy, is
his belief 2 To an extent, he echoes with the English humorist
the sentiment of "0 Spirit! Spirit of Literature, Alien to Law!"'
without probing too deeply into its truth. Perhaps this may be
exaggeration: the older jurists held a keen appreciation for the
genius of the romantic novelists and poets of their time. Indeed,
it is written that Coke used Chaucer to illustrate points in his
opinions." But as the impact of the Industrial Revolution thrust
against the then decaying walls of an agricultural society, and
the lawyer was forced from the leisurely life of a country squire
or the broad and selfless activities of the statesman into the hur-
ried and struggling movements of a commercial community, in-
evitably his ideals and standards were transformed. Reading, if
indulged, was solely for profit: a pragmatic test overlay all the
lawyer's interests, as it overlay the entire philosophy of industri-
alism. Though a lawyer's craft resembles that of a literary artist
in so far as its emphasis lies upon the arts of reading and writ-
ing, its effect is more tangible, its results give more material sat-
isfaction. By the use of his pleadings, by the interpretations of
opinions, the lawyer gains for his client a money judgment, or
the ejectment of an undesirable tenant. On the other hand, less
ostensible are the benefits of the work of the writer; and even
though his influence on the mind of his reader may be insidious
and overriding, infrequent are the instances in which concrete
change comes about as a result.5
1. C. BEARD & M. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMEmCAN CIVIIIZATION, at x (1930).
2. Compare this to: "I am told by friends that a judicial opinion has no business to
be literature." B. CARDozo, Law and Literature, in LAW AND LITERATURE 3 (1931). Car-
dozo is evidently using literature in the sense of art.
3. I. BROWNE, LAW AND LAWYERS I LrrERATuRE 330 (reprint 1982, original 1883)
(citing The Dilly and the D's, PUNCH (C. 1851)).
4. See J. GEsT, THE LAWYER IN LTERATURE 162-63 (reprint 1982, original 1913). Car-
dozo comments charmingly on this custom: "In days not far remote, judges were not
unwilling to embellish their deliverances with quotations from the poets. I shall observe
towards such a practice the tone of decent civility that is due to those departed." B.
CARDozo, supra note 2, at 29.
5. An example of the effect of a book upon current practices is Upton Sinclair's 1905
novel entitled The Jungle, which was a factor in the passage of the Pure Food and Drug
Act. Charles Dickens' Bleak House is commonly said to have founded the initiation of
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I Still another consideration affords the lawyer cause for dis-
regarding the value of literature. His is a mind that deals with a
system of symbols and concepts quite separate from the world
he inhabits. The all-embracing nature of these symbols and con-
cepts casts a shadow which dwarfs the artist's works into insig-
nificance. Cardozo, surely not to be counted among the illiberal
of our jurists, admits the widespread tendency among the legal
profession to depreciate the value of fiction:
But I overemphasize and exaggerate if I seem to paint the picture
of any active opposition that is more than sporadic and excep-
tional to so amiable a weakness as a love of art and letters. A
common attitude with lawyers is one, not of active opposition, but
of amused or cynical indifference.'
Even with Holmes, one feels a trace of the "amused or cynical
indifference" of which Cardozo speaks. In one place Holmes
exclaims:
To the lover of the law, how small a thing seems the novel-
ist's tales of the loves and fates of Daphne and Chloe! How pale a
phantom even the Circe of poetry, transforming mankind with in-
toxicating dreams of fiery ether, and the foam of summer seas,
and glowing greensward, and the white arms of woman.7
True, in Holmes' utterances one discerns a species of mysticism,
of awe for the mighty reaches of the law; yet in part, at least, his
words imply the same attitude of disdain and indifference.
The antagonism between the literary man and the lawyer
may be partially due to the criticism which reform-waging au-
thors have visited on lawyers in general;8 in a kind of retribu-
the reform of English Chancery practice; but see J. G&WT, supra note 4, at 29.
6. B. CARDozo, supra note 2, at 4.
7. SimacHas By OLum WESNDE. HOLMES 16-17 (1891) (delivered February 5, 1885).
Further he says: "Of course, the law is not the place for the artist or the poet. The law is
the calling of thinkers." Id. at 22.
8. The following is a common enough view:
Lawyers in the main were intellectual mercenaries to be bought and sold in any
cause. It amused him to hear the ethical and emotional platitudes of lawyers, to
see how readily they would lie, steal, prevaricate, misrepresent in almost any cause
and for any purpose. Great lawyers were merely great unscrupulous subtleties, like
himself, sitting back in dark, close-woven lairs like spiders and awaiting the ap-
proach of unwary human flies.
T. DamsER, Taz FNANcmR 328 (1912).
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tion, the lawyer heaps an equal amount of contempt upon the
writer. It may be partially due to the industrial age in which life
is now immersed, and with which the lawyer has become affili-
ated; the artist finds this atmosphere alien and unfruitful to
himself 9 It may be partially due to the reluctance (which ap-
pears to be traditional with the legal profession) of the lawyer to
admit the interdependence of the law with the other social disci-
plines; 10 he equally refuses to accept the realistic novel as any
evidence of the life against which these social disciplines must
be thrown into relief. But whatever the reason, the conflict in
essence is based on unsubstantiated assumptions, premises not
too closely queried.
Law and literature are connected not tenuously, but inti-
mately: as branches of our culture they are subject to the same
forces and they react jointly to them. The cultural force which
has pervaded and dominated the intellectual phases of American
life more thoroughly than any other trend of thought is that
movement which is, for the lack of a better adjective, called "re-
alistic." In philosophy and literature, the term has had a some-
what more expansive meaning than it has possessed as applied
to legal writing.1" In the United States, the vogue of realistic
fiction sprang into prominence by 1880 and was strongly embed-
ded by 1900; it has held full sway to the present time. The traces
of realistic thought in all fields of intellectual endeavor are
plainly marked - in economic theory through the writings of
Thorstein Veblen, in philosophy through the pragmatism of Wil-
liam James and John Dewey, in government through Charles
9. As Brookes noted:
No one who is in touch with the world today will affirm too confidently that the
breach (industrialism) between the artist and society is likely to be healed in our
generation. . .. But of one thing we can be sure: if the breach is not healed, it
will mean the death not only of the artist but of society itself as we have known it.
V. BROOKES, SKRrCHES IN CRMCISM 141 (1932).
10. See Harno, Social Planning and Perspective Through Law, 19 A.B.A. J. 201
(1933).
11. Realism is used here in the literary sense, that is, as the description of a method
of approach, and not in the philosophical sense of the term. Empiricism, pragmatism,
instrumentalism, and utilitarianism are all related in meaning to "literary" realism if one
wishes philosophical parallels. A possible definition of realism in this sense is the discus-
sion of materials with the absence of unconscious illusion. Compare this with the defini-
tion of empiricism in G. SANTAYANA, SCEMlISM AND ANIMAL FArTH 3 (reprint 1955, origi-
nal 1923).
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Beard and John Burgess, in history through Breasted and
Robinson and the Beards. The spread of realism as the funda-
mental attitude toward the problems besetting each of the social
disciplines was complete by the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury; it has invaded, if not thoroughly overcome, the positions of
the older approaches looking toward European sources. In litera-
ture, of course, the development of realism has had a more obvi-
ous course, owing undoubtedly to the fact that the term was first
affixed to its manifestations in fiction. In law, though its path
has been more obscure; nevertheless, the common signs lie im-
printed on modern legal theory. The realistic influence has af-
fected both law and literature with virtually the same result.
The parallel development in point of time is astounding in the
face of the apparent cultural lag in the law. A review of the
American scene during the last fifty years will serve to demon-
strate how close a resemblance there exists between literary real-
ism and legal realism.
II
Fifty years ago: 1880; the time when Holmes was engaged in
writing his immortal The Common Law;"3 when William Dean
Howells was first mulling over the daring new theories of the art
of Flaubert and Balzac and de Maupassant and Tolstoi: two
years but pass, and Howells brings forth one of the first realistic
novels (A Modern Instance)" produced in America. The air is
stirring with the breath of scientific thought: twenty years ago
Darwin had stunned the world with his theory of evolution; and
the reverberations are still sounding throughout the channels of
human learning - indeed, the word science comes to mean all
knowledge, instead of a mere division of learning.'
It is this expansion of the theory into literature and law and
economics and politics alike that is truly amazing. Through Dar-
win's theory of evolution (doubtless because it touched so funda-
mentally on man's beliefs) is popularized the concept of the sci-
entific method, and this offspring has in large measure
12. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (M. Howe ed. 1968).
13. W. HOWELLS, A MODERN INSTANCE (1881).
14. See generally More, The Pretensions of Science, in HUMANISM AND AMERICA 3
(N. Foerster ed. reprint 1967, original 1930).
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dominated the intellectual world since.15 Consider the implica-
tion of the scientific method in the invention of the casebook
system at Harvard Law School about 1870: Langdell hoped to
trace the growth of a doctrine from its beginnings in a stray case
until it was firmly embedded into the corpus of the law." The
philosophy of Herbert Spencer endorses it wholeheartedly; in
the United States, the scientific method has captivated William
James and Charles Peirce, and a "truly American philosophy,"
pragmatism, is born.17 American literature, likewise, feels its ap-
peal: Howells dimly falls under its shadow when he admires the
writings of Leo Tolstoi and Gustav Flaubert. Yet, let us not
overestimate. Though in the late 1800's the theory of evolution
is in full bloom within the world of philosophical thought, in the
law it has no foundation save the blessings of Langdell, and
American literature is still under the insensible sway of Euro-
pean romanticism.
In 1880 the American legalist still clung to the traditional
notion of law as a self-sufficient organism, prepared to solve the
most novel problem by means of deductive logic. 8 The law was
certain and immutable, it was held, for it consisted of principles,
very broad and generalized in scope, which by the use of infer-
ence fitted any case arising; the judge became merely an artisan
15. "To be sure, in strict logic, this work in biology (Origins of Species) does not
apply to inorganic things; nevertheless when added to developments in other fields it has
had a tremendous influence in altering men's views of logic and of what we call the 'laws
of nature."' Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 15 JOHNS HOPKINS ALUMNI MAO.
213, 222 (1927).
16. See Turner, Changing Objectives in Legal Education, 40 YALE L.J. 576, 583 n.19
(1931); see also Dickinson, The Law Behind Law, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 113, 141 (1929); cf.
Cook, supra note 15, at 1.
It is noteworthy that Langdell considered law a science, and believed that the
materials for its study might be found in books alone. See Frank, What Constitutes a
Good Legal Education?, 19 A.B.A. J. 723 (1933).
17. James and Peirce appear to have caught the germ of the idea almost at the same
time - in January, 1878. Thus, see Sellars, Current Realism, in PHILosoPHY TODAY 19
(E. Schaub ed. reprint 1968, original 1928).
18. The attitude is best expressed by Chief Justice Gray in Norway Plains Co. v.
Boston & M.R.R., 67 Mass. 263, 1 Gray 266 (1854). The analogy between the domination
of American literature by Europe -England, particularly - and the domination of legal
theory in United States by the English Blackstonian philosophy seems complete. On the
literary aspect, see V. CALVERTON, THE LIBERATION oF A.mcIcAN LrrERATruR 286 (1932);
on the juristic aspect, see R. PouND, THE SPmrr oF THE COMMON LAW 150 (reprint 1931,
original 1921).
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at his craft, skilled in applying solid principles of law. It is in
this stultifying and illusion-bearing atmosphere that Holmes was
educated into the law; he did not, however, allow it to overcome
his skeptical outlook. In 1872, one sees the initial stage of
Holmes' revolt in his realistic treatment of the role played by
grain elevators in commerce and the legal rights and duties of
their owners. 19 Furthermore, he had associated himself with men
who were likewise dissatisfied with the old concepts, and who
were destined to build anew within the interstices of
knowledge.2 0 It is put clearly by Felix Frankfurter:
But the Zeitgeist moved also through 0. W. Holmes, Jr. He came
to maturity when Darwin had upset men's most ancient beliefs.
The evolutionary doctrines worked as ferment beyond their im-
mediate scope. If Genesis had to be "reinterpreted," the texts of
the law could hardly claim sanctity.. . . We now see the kinship
of Whitman and Melville and Holmes. All three express man's
passionate effort in the face of illimitable mystery of the universe
- Whitman and Melville as artists, Holmes as thinker. '
And this "ferment," by a slow but ceaseless process, at last led
to a magnificent explosion in juridical thought in which Holmes
is the principal actor, beginning with The Common Law"' and
ending with the essay, Law in Science and Science in Law2' in
1899.
It is Holmes' now celebrated definition of law, as that which
happens to the bad man, which created the foundation for all
realistic thinking in the law." This definition dismisses the es-
sentially romantic theory established by Blackstone and the
early American jurists for a juridical test secured on occurrence,
rather than on the prevailing legal rule. Even in his first juridical
19. Holmes, Grain Elevators, 6 Am. L. Rev. 464 (1872). For another strikingly realis-
tic article, see Washburn, Lecture on the Study and Practice of the Law, id. at 135.
20. For instance, Holmes associated with Charles Peirce and William James. See
Frankfurter, The Early Writings of O.W. Holmes, Jr., 44 HAev. L. Rsv. 717, 721 n.5
(1931).
21. Id. at 722-23.
22. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw (M. Howe ed. 1968).
23. Frankfurter, supra note 20, at 210.
24. Llewellyn has traced the course of the development of the definition in Holmes'
writings and finds it coming to full flower in 1897 in O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law,
in CoLLECTzD LGAL PAPERS 169 (reprint 1952, original 1920). Llewellyn, What Price
Contract? -An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALz L.J. 704, 717 n.39 (1931).
1983]
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writings, Holmes implies a lack of certainty in the law."' He as-
sails vigorously the illusion that words in themselves contain just
solutions to the cases before the court.2 6 Holmes' view is that
law is not dogma, an ancient wisdom which no man may doubt;
it is flexible; it grows as man grows: "It is perfectly proper to
regard and study the law simply as a great anthropological docu-
ment.12 7 Nor can law be conceived of as a science as mathemat-
ics is a science; the judge in more ways than one is the master of
the rights of the parties - there need be no inevitable out-
come.28 "Holmes says that law is not pure mathematics; that the
so-called self-evident truths of the traditional jurisprudence are
not self-evident; and that many of the axioms of legal thinking
do not appear on the surface but are concealed and must be dug
out for inspection. 2 9 In place of the traditional method of the
eighteenth century jurist, Holmes substituted the scientific spirit
shaped to the demands of the law, for the experimental system
could not be imported wholesale into the technique of the judge.
Holmes' writings of this period are saturated with the "science-
as-savior" notion; time and again he dwells on the importance to
jurisprudence of adopting the laboratory method.30 Against the
25. Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARv. L. REV. 1, 7 (1894).
26. "It is not the first use but the tiresome repetition of inadequate catchwords
which I am observing - phrases which originally were contributions, but which, by their
very felicity, delay further analysis for fifty years." O.W. HOLMES, Law in Science -
Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 230-31 (reprint 1952, original 1920).
27. Id. at 212.
28. Holmes noted:
The true science of the law does not consist mainly in a theological working out of
dogma or a logical development as in mathematics, or only in a study of it as an
anthropological document from the outside; an even more important part consists
in the establishment of its postulates from within upon accurately measured social
desires instead of tradition.
Id. at 225-26.
29. Frank, Mr. Justice Holmes and Non-Euclidean Legal Thinking, 17 CORNELL
L.Q. 568, 571 (1932).
30. Holmes stated in 1886: "The new work is now being done. Under the influence
of Germany, science is gradually drawing legal history into its sphere. The facts are being
scrutinized by eyes microscopic in intensity and panoramic in scope." SPEEcHES BY OL-
VER WENDELL HOLMES 34 (1891) (delivered November 5, 1886).
Then, in 1897, he wrote:
But in that field, as in the other, I have had in mind an ultimate dependence upon
science because it is finally for science to determine, so far as it can, the relative
worth of our different social ends, and, as I have tried to hint, it is our estimate of
the proportion between these, now often blind and unconscious, that leads us to
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss1/3
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facts -particularly against the changing conditions of society -
the legal rule must be tested; and the true transformation of the
rule, if in fact any has taken place, can only be ascertained by
sifting and by investigation. There rests the worth of science:
that it has evolved a way to deal accurately and coldly with the
facts. "For the rational study of the law the black-letter man
may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the
man of statistics and the master of economics,"8 Holmes pro-
phetically assures the lawyer of the period. Though his prophecy
has not wholly come true, save as the figure of Brandeis arises to
fulfill it, it is clear that he singles out the disciplines of statistics
and economics, because of all the social "sciences" he considers
them to reflect more closely the use of the scientific method in
their construction of formulae and theorems based on data gath-
ered by samplings and compilation.
Yet Holmes, to be sure, would reject indignantly the conclu-
sion that he is the founder of a school of legal philosophy, even
though today the legal realists claim him as their master."2 His
indignation would be understandable, for he is at heart a skep-
tic, and not a creator of a system of values or a master of meta-
physical subtlety.8 He distrusts the simple acceptance of the old
and the tried; without more, he distrusts as well the construction
of any elaborate theory, for he believes that in time, it too must
topple. Not rigid theories, but working hypotheses are needed:
they must be experiments, "as all life is an experiment." If he
were to approve any principle, it would be the skepticism of the
immutable principle. Thus, though he is in attitude and associa-
tion related to James and Peirce, he cannot entertain their phil-
osophical concept of pragmatism.85 He remains free of any strict
insist upon and to enlarge the sphere of one principle and to allow another gradu-
ally to dwindle into atrophy.
O.W. HOLMES, supra note 26, at 242.
31. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 24, at 187.
32. Thus Frank implies that Holmes' work is the basis on which all realistic trends
in modern juristic thinking rests. See Frank, supra note 29, at 576.
33. "Holmes, almost alone among lawyers, adopts that skeptical attitude upon
which modern science has builded, that modern skepticism which looks upon thought as
instrumental and acknowledges the transient and relative nature of all human thought-
contrivances." J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MrN 259-60 (1930).
34. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
35. That Holmes' thinking nears pragmatism, there can be no doubt Cf. O.W.
1983]
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principled system bending him to its dictates; it is he who sights
the line of demarcation in the individual case and wields the
principle along it.
It cannot be disputed that Holmes' iconoclasm does not
pass beyond the bounds of intellectual inquiry. In politics and in
economic theory, he stays basically conservative. In socialism, as
in other panaceas for ills, he finds little favor. By nature a skep-
tic, he is at the same time, an individualist. On the bench, the
method which he adopted to uphold statutes tending toward so-
cialism and attacked as unconstitutional did not involve the
question of their wisdom; indeed, he might have doubted their
efficacy to deal with the evils they were supposed to cure, but he
considered his opinion as purely personal, and the legislation as
representative of the will of the people.5 O It was not so much
that he supported the more liberal approaches to socialized rem-
edies as that he tolerated them. The new realism was a part of
his juristic skepticism, but it did not change his beliefs outside
the bounds of the law.
The fictional literature of the period reflects the impact of
similar forces. It is not a happy period in our literary history:
Walt Whitman still is reviled for his "sensual" poetry; Mark
Twain is not understood save as a humorist commenting on the
rude customs of the frontier; the Victorian morality of the times
dominates the novel and the short story. Illusions abound in the
current fiction: virtue is ever triumphant, the just cause is al-
ways victorious, and true love runs its sweet and righteous way.
No wonder, then, that Howells, who has travelled in Europe and
has acquaintance with the works of Tolstoi and Flaubert, grows
HOLMES, supra note 26, at 224-25.
That pragmatism is related directly to all attempts to struggle free from traditions
and to establish the experimental methods as a basis of approach, see C. TAEUSCH, POL-
ICY Am EmIcs IN BusiNss 42 (1931). Compare this to William James' definition of
pragmatism: "[Tihe attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 'categories,'
supposed necessities; and of looking toward last things, fruits, consequences, facts." W.
JAMES, PRAGMATISM 47 (reprint 1963, original 1907). This aspect of pragmatism is dis-
cussed in J. DEwEY, ESSAYS IN Expffa zNTAL LoGIc 305 (reprint 1953, original 1916).
36. An indication of his conservatism is seen in Holmes' habit of dissenting once on
a particular issue from the majority opinion; the second time the issue arrives before the
court, he accepts as his attitude the attitude of the majority and concurs.
37. It is significant that most of the stories by Horatio Alger were written at this
time.
[Vol. 4:29
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restive in this cloying milieu. He perceives the frontier spirit im-
buing the West to be a natural effusion of the veritable Ameri-
can character; he finds it free and democratic, and of a new and
significant flavor.8 8 On the other hand, he finds the older spirit
to be less robust and more precious, proceeding from the Victo-
rian influence and the similar Bostonian tradition. Surrounding
the then literary capital of America, the older spirit had im-
printed its values upon the current literary scene.3 To Howells,
the older standards possess little of the American outlook; they
falsely represent the stream of life flowing in the nation. He felt
keenly that the true art of the novelist lay in a realistic ap-
proach, in getting down on paper the speech of the people in
common conversation, in describing everyday affairs as they ac-
tually occurred. "Realism," said Howells, "is nothing more and
nothing less than the truthful treatment of material. '40 In a
number of novels, the most prominent of which were A Modern
Instance,1 The Rise of Silas Lapham,42 and A Hazard of New
Fortunes,' he utilized his method to portray contemporary
American life.
This naturalistic treatment of material involves in essence
the acceptance of the scientific spirit into literature. Its applica-
tion requires the patient and sustained observation of the facts
upon which the fictional counterpart is to be based. It entails
probing into the conditions of life even as Holmes' realism in the
law entails probing into the conditions of life." Only the pur-
38. Compare the frontier spirit in the law at the same time. See Pound, Some Prin-
ciples of Procedural Reform, 4 ILL. L. Rav. 388, 397-98 (1910). The spirit of disillusion-
ment issued from the collision of the frontier ideal with the older traditions and urban
life; thus: "That life is good, that human nature is excellent, that man's fate can be
molded like the potter's clay, that democratic progress is the law of evolution-these
conceptions no longer seemed so self-evident as they had seemed to an earlier genera-
tion." Parrington, The Development of Realism, in THE REINT ERErATiON OF AMmCAN
LrrERATuRE 153 (N. Foerster ed. 1959). Cf Frank, supra note 29.
39. "[W]e even felt that we failed in so far as we expressed something native quite
in our own way. The literary theories we accepted were New England theories, the criti-
cism we valued was New England criticism, or, more strictly speaking, Boston theories,
Boston criticism." W. How.LLs, Lrrnmyv FRIENDs AND ACQUAiNTANCE 115 (1901).
40. See Parrington, supra note 38, at 145.
41. W. HowELLs, A MODERN INSTANCE (1881).
42. W. HowzLLs, THE Run OF SmAs LAPImM (Modern Library ed. 1951).
43. W. HowmLas, A HAZARD OF NEW FoRTuNES (1890).
44. Cf. R. BL"KENsHmP, AMmCAN LrrmTURz 478-79 (1931). The author states:
1983]
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pose for which the investigation is made differs. To be sure,
Howells owes allegiance directly to Tolstoi and Flaubert, and
not to Darwin and Huxley, but indirectly, and under analysis as
to result, the assimilation is unmistakeable. Thus, with Howells
as leader, a school of realistic writers slowly grew; Hamlin Gar-
land and Edward Eggleston became ardent disciples.
Howells' realism was, however, not pure realism. As he him-
self admitted, it was "reticent realism. ' 45 Truthful representa-
tion was desired, yes, but it must not pass beyond the limits of
propriety. That is, Tolstoi's realism, because it was "moral," and
certainly "Christian," was for Howells the correct form of real-
ism. Howells abhorred Zola's realism because it was vulgar, and
in parts obscene. For Howells, sexual matters rested under an
absolute taboo. As for politics and the rising strife over industri-
alism, he remained for the most part silent.46 Like Holmes, his
iconoclasm was never carried from the conflict of intellectual in-
quiry into the more tangible struggle on which men's existence
depended. Yet, from him, as does legal realism from Holmes,
stems the literary realism of our own day.
The two men are impressively alike in the parallel positions
which they maintain in their respective fields. For both, their
realism consists of an iconoclastic attitude toward illusion: illu-
sion in the law, illusion in the writing of literature. 7 For both,
their thinking begins the movement of the realistic influence in
America, which (with pragmatism) affects current philosophical
outlooks. For both, their realism does not extend beyond intel-
lectual boundaries; it remains tightly closed to the conditions of
Science is one of the immediate ancestors of realism in that it gave a method of
procedure to the new school of novelists.. . . One of the chief requisites of a sci-
entist is the ability and patience to carry out sustained observation and experi-
mentation.. . . It was from the procedure of such men that the realist derived his
new method of writing fiction.
Id.; see also Foerster, Factors in American Literary History, in THE R mt.rParrATIoN
OF AMERICAN LITERATURE 23 (N. Foerster ed. 1959).
45. See V. CALVERTON, supra note 18, at 380; cf. L. MUMFORD, THE GOLDEN DAY 167-
70 (1926).
46. He did, however, play a vigorous part in the defense of the Haymarket anar-
chists. See V. CALVERTON, supra note 18, at 379 n.33. In regard to his prudishness, see G.
DE MILLE, LrrEARY CRMCISM IN AMERICA 188-89 (reprint 1967, original 1931).
47. Romanticism in art may be thought of as wilful illusion. Compare Frank Norris'
conception as a variation from the norm. See F. WALKER, FRANK NORRIs: A BIOGRAPHY
82-83 (1932).
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the American scene. Their realism was only tentative, condi-
tional: this marked the first stage in the development.
III
If Holmes and Howells did not find themselves embroiled
into the bitter struggle resulting from the increasing dissatisfac-
tion with the new industrial order which had evolved since the
Civil War, and the rapid ascension of the United States toward
the top rank of world nations, younger and more easily inflamed
writers did. Capitalism as a practice of commercial organization
never had more fertile ground: corporations had extended domi-
nance over an entire industry, had monopolized the supply of
single and allied products. The small entrepreneur had no
chance of competing with these Titans; they engulfed him with-
out knowing of his presence. To be sure, the signs of a critical
discontent were not lacking in the 1880's. True, Henry George's
Progress and Poverty,'8 Henry Adams' Democracy,4 and Ed-
ward Bellamy's novel, Looking Backward0 were early portents
of discontent, but the chorus of voices raising protest did not
gain strength until nearly the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury. In the meantime, the course of realistic fiction had swung
to the left, away from the conditional realism of Howells toward
the impressionism of Stephen Crane, and the hardy naturalism
of Frank Norris. 1 The authors of Maggie: A Girl of the Streets"
and Vandover and the Brute5 broke through convention to tear
the veil from the actual misery and brutality of life. In these
48. H. GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY (1880).
49. H. ADAMS, DEMOCRACY (1880).
50. E. BELUAmy, LOOKING BACKWARD (1882). Cf. T. DICKINSON, THE MAuNG OF
AmCAN LImIETuRE 635 (1932). Looking Backward was hardly in the realistic manner,
but rather was in a romantic vein: a description of the occurrences of the twentieth cen-
tury from the standpoint of an observer living in the twenty-first century.
51. Naturalism is used interchangeably in a broad sense with realism, but essentially
it connotes pessimistic realism (close to determinism). Id. at 511. In modern legal real-
ism, naturalism is apparently equivalent to realism. Compare Frank's comment on
Holmes: "Holmes, with his never-to-be-forgotten bad man, began naturalistic legal
thinking." Frank, supra note 28, at 570.
52. S. CRANE, MAGGIE: A GIRL OF no STREETS (reprint 1966, original 1893).
53. F. NoRms, Vandover and the Brute, in 5 COMPLETE WORKS OF FRANK NoRms
(1928).
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novels (and in A Red Badge of Courage" and McTeague") the
tide of realism overflows the narrow confines in which Howells
would have held its channel and escapes forever. During the dec-
ade prior to 1900, however, the realistic novel was not employed
as a weapon against social ills: it remained, as it had with How-
ells, merely a theory of artistic expression.
The discontent was further enhanced by the percolation
into this country of the economic determinism of Marx on the
philosophical side, and of the force of socialism on the political
side.6 Realism was slowly transformed into naturalism:
From the efforts to find the law of causation there developed
two schools of thought, the biological determinists who followed
the leadership of Darwin, and the economic determinists who fol-
lowed Karl Marx. Zola's theory and practice of fiction developed
from his knowledge of these two schools of scientific and eco-
nomic thought. 7
And Zola's novels were the admiration of Frank Norris: he
thought the novelist could make enlarged case studies revealing
"the Truth" by learning the social, biological, and economic laws
controlling mankind.58 Note the objective purpose which Norris
held in mind: there is no hint of the reform of mankind in his
message. The allegiance of the novelist to his art is still unaf-
fected by the evils in society.
It is in the twentieth century, however, that the flame un-
easily burning among the liberals bursts into a conflagration.
The novel, still realistic in form, becomes a social document, an
article of blatant propaganda for a change in the social order.
So, Frank Norris writes his protests against the Railroad Trust
and the speculators in The Octopus5 ' and The Pit,60 Robert
Herrick his criticism of Big Business in The Real Worlde" and
54. S. CRANE, A RED BADGz ov CouRAGE (1894).
55. F. NoRms, McTEAGtm (reprint 1971).
56. Thus emerged the Knights of Labor and Granger movements in the Middle
West.
57. R. BLANKENSHIP, supra note 44, at 512.
58. F. WALKER, supra note 47, at 253-54; cf. R. BLANEENSHip, supra note 44, at 283.
59.. F. NoRms, THE OcTopus (1901).
60. F. NoRms, THE Prr (1910).
61. R. HEREUCK, THE REAL WORLD (1900).
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The Memoirs of An American Citizen,6e and Upton Sinclair ex-
poses the Beef Trust in The Jungle,63 with a resultant scandal
that so shocks the nation that a presidential investigation is or-
dered, and the Pure Food and Drug Act is a direct consequence.
Moreover, during this era the muckraker reveals the corruption
of the political machine, and the alliance between Big Business
and politics. No novelist of any importance in the whirling tur-
moil of the times avoids the call to the conflict; all joyously for-
get their erstwhile occupation with the ends of art for the ends
of society." The era runs its reformist career within the limits of
fifteen years: from 1900 to 1915.6 The beginning of the World
War terminates the liberal protestations; it is not until 1932 that
one sees the re-emergence of a similar liberal emphasis - after a
hiatus of another fifteen years." Most notable is the essentially
reformist character of the realism in the literature of the period
- a realism no more pure "realism" than Howells' realism,
though pure "realism" had its moment with Norris and Crane
(and perhaps with Dreiser at a later date) in the 1890's. Norris'
sociological novel, designed to be an impartial research for truth,
for the capture of laws governing mankind, is changed into a
crusading pamphlet; "the sociological novelist was a reformer,
seeking particular ends, rather than a critical analysis of life;
and not until the appearance of a generation familiar with the
62. R. HERRICK, THE MEMiORs OF AN AmERIcAN CITIZEN (1905).
63. U. SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906).
64. The first muckraking article seemingly appeared in 1902. See V. CALVERON,
supra note 18, at 386 n.47.
65. As Parrington noted:
Few writers in the years between 1903 and 1917 escaped being drawn into the
movement - an incorrigible romantic, perhaps, like the young James Branch
Cabell, or a cool patrician like Edith Wharton; and with such popular novelists as
Winston Churchill, Robert Herrick, Ernest Poole, David Graham Phillips, Upton
Sinclair, and Jack London embellishing the rising liberalism with dramatic heroes
and villains, and dressing their salads with the wickedness of Big Business; with
such political leaders as Bob La Follette and Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow
Wilson beating up the remotest villages for recruits; with such scholars as Thor-
stein Veblen, Charles A. Beard, and John Dewey, and such lawyers as Louis Bran-
deis, Frank P. Walsh, and Samuel Untermyer, the movement gathered such mo-
mentum and quickened such a ferment as had not been known before in the lands
since the day of the Abolition Controversy.
3 V. PARRINGTON, MAIN CuEMrs IN AMmECAN THouGHT 405-06 (1927).
66. Compare Parrington's observation that realistic periods coincide with periods of
depression. Parrington, supra note 38, at 140.
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teachings of the laboratory did realism in America come of
age."'67 Thus, "sociological" realism succeeds "reticent" realism.
The developments in the law still follow the general cultural
trend of the times; the connecting link is embodied in the person
of Roscoe Pound. Pound, following in Holmes' footsteps, at-
tempts what the master refused to essay: to erect a definite,
workable legal philosophy in place of the outmoded and inade-
quate ideology of the ancient (a hundred years past) juridical
theory. Pound's theme, in short, is sociological jurisprudence.
The coincidence in the use of the adjective "sociological" to de-
scribe the type of novel popular at the time, and to identify this
particular legalistic approach is not accidental; basically, the
philosophy behind each movement is similar. First of all, Pound
exhibits favor for socialism rather than for individualism. He ex-
claimed in one of his earliest articles, "How shall we lead our law
to hold a more even balance between individualism and social-
ism"'68 in deploring the emphasis that the then doctrines of law
placed upon the individual. Furthermore, like Norris and Crane,
Pound is moved by European writers; if not Zola, it is Von Iher-
ing and Stammler.69 He sounds a call to arms to all lawyers; he
is hardly the armchair philosopher musing over the injustices of
mankind, but rather a militant reformist bent on transforming
legal thinking. Pound calls for a sociological jurisprudence, for
the law is outgrown by the new customs and by the change in
habits and points of view. 0
Pound sees, as Holmes has seen, that the law must be bri-
dled to reality, but where Holmes could not bring himself to a
direct remolding of its rules to shape conditions, here Pound
cries that the remedy lies in study - study of the facts, and
67. Id. at 142.
68. Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law?, 5 COLUM. L. REv. 339, 352 (1905).
69. See Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARv. L.
REv. 591 (1911) (Part I) [hereinafter cited as Pound (Part I)]; id. at 25 HAsv. L. REV.
140, 149 (1912) (Part II) [hereinafter cited as Pound (Part II)].
70. Pound stated:
It is their task to create in this country a true sociological jurisprudence, to de-
velop a thorough understanding between the people and the law, to insure that
the common law remain, what its exponents have always insisted it is - the cus-
tom of the people, the expression of their habits of thought and actions as to the
relations of men with each other.
Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GaasN BAG 607, 615 (1907).
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then of the theory to be employed in applying the facts to the
theories' pattern." He has discovered what Holmes has known,
but has been none too sure of its ultimate value - the conse-
quence of the acceptance of the theory of evolution upon all
thought. In one place he says of the lawyer:
It is the work of lawyers to make the law in action conform to
the law in the books, not by futile thunderings against popular
lawlessness, nor eloquent exhortations to obedience of the written
law, but by making the law in the books such that the law in
action can conform to it, and providing a speedy, cheap and effi-
cient legal mode of applying it. 2
The procedure to be used is the scientific method developed in
the physical sciences; an adaptation of an empirical, pragmatic
theory to the law.73 Already has that movement bestirred the
social sciences, and since law is so closely related to economics
and government, it should not await an enforced reform.
"[W]ith the rise and growth of political, economic, and social
science, . ..the time was ripe for a wholly new tendency, and
that tendency, which may be called the sociological tendency,
has become well established in Continental Europe."' 4
Together with the pragmatic method, Pound believes the
new jurist must be equipped with all the learning evoked by the
companion social sciences, and with their aid to transform legal
rules to the extent required a greater perspective. A unification
of the social sciences is ultimately desired, and law must look to
this grand union for guidance, and indeed must join with it as
sovereign to regulate social phenomena.7 5 But what Pound en-
71. "Before we can have sound theories here we need facts on which to build them.
Even after we get sound theories, we shall need facts to enable us to apply them." R.
PouND, THE SpiRIr OF THE COMMON LAW 213-14 (1921).
72. Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 36 (1910).
73. Pound stated:
The sociological movement in jurisprudence is a movement for pragmatism as a
philosophy of law; for the adjustment of principles and doctrines to the human
conditions they are to govern rather than to assumed first principles; for putting
the human factor in the central place and relegating logic to its true position as an
instrument.
Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605, 609-10 (1908).
74. Pound (Part I), supra note 69, at 614.
75. "Summarily stated, the sociological jurist pursues a comparative study of legal
systems, legal doctrines, and legal institutions as social phenomena, and criticizes them
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deavors to impress most strongly on the minds of the contempo-
rary lawyer is the need for study of the present social state with
relation to the law. The lawyer, he considers, is essentially con-
servative, reluctant to change: "[A]fter philosophical, political,
economic and sociological thought has given the eighteenth-cen-
tury [the] law of nature, it is still the premise of the American
lawyer. ' '1 6 This persistent attitude the lawyer must shed: he
must become receptive to new thought and to new ways of ac-
tion. Pound recognizes expressly what Holmes said implicitly:
the influence of the Darwinian evolution in scientific thinking is
the mainspring in his appeal for a sociological jurisprudence.
In general, Pound is promoting reform, pleading for an ac-
tive crusade against "the dead hand of the past." Particularly is
his reformist zeal shown in his assaults on the then existing
criminal law7 s and on antiquated procedure.7 9 In this role he
falls entirely within the spirit of the era; but his fervor trans-
ports him not beyond the confines of the law. Though he calls
for legal reform, his voice is not raised for reform in existing
business practices: he does not join with Sinclair, Herrick, and
Churchill in advocating a change in governmental or economic
control. Nor does he accept the Marxian concept of class strug-
gle,80 though he notes its possible effect on legalistic thinking,8"
and is aware of the attitude of Brooks Adams, who explains ju-
ridical decision by its tenets.8s Unlike Holmes, Adams leads the
with respect to their relation to social conditions and social progress." Pound, The Scope
and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. L. REV. 489, 516 (1912) (Part III).
Compare this quotation with the following:
While Professor Moore tells us that the time has come 'in the development of the
pragmatic movement for systematic and detailed applications of pragmatic con-
ceptions and methods to specific problems, rather than further discussion of gen-
eral principles,' unhappily discussion of general principles goes on, and a pragma-
tist philosophy of law is yet to come.
Id. (quoting the preface to Pragmatism and Its Critics).
76. Pound, supra note 72, at 25.
77. Pound (Part III), supra note 75, at 496.
78. Pound, Enforcement of Law, 20 GREEN BAG 401 (1908).
79. Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 ILL. L. REV. 388, 491 (1910).
80. The perception is not that he should have, but rather that he did not, while
Sinclair and Norris did.
81. Pound (Part II), supra note 69, at 162.
82. Adams, The Modern Conception of Animus, 19 GREEN BAG 12 (1907). The con-
servative reply to Adams is given by F.M. Burdick. Burdick, Is Law the Expression of
Class Selfishness?, 25 HARV. L. Rgv. 349 (1912).
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way for reform within the law; like Holmes, he is quiescent as to
rumblings outside the strictly legal field.as Here the complete
analogy falls short; but the resemblance to literary realism
remains.
If Pound were looking for the appearance of a sociological
jurist, he did not have to await the coming long. Louis Brandeis
was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1916 (note the designa-
tion occurred at the end of the second era of realism), and
swiftly became known as the "Sociological Jurist." No wonder
that conservative forces fought bitterly his approval by the Sen-
ate: he is one of the rebels who strikes for economic as well as
political independence for the small merchant.8 " His attack is
vigorous, not indirect:
Politically, the American workingman is free - so far as the law
can make him so. But is he really free? Can any man be really
free who is constantly in danger of becoming dependent for mere
subsistence upon somebody and something else than his exertion
and conduct? Financial dependence is consistent with freedom
only where claim to support rests upon right, and not upon
favor."'
His is the large sympathy with the small businessman in opposi-
tion to the oppression of the trusts, just as with Sinclair; his
writing prior to 1916 was one vast dissent against the rise and
practices of huge corporations.86 It is to be noted, however, that
Brandeis does not attack capitalism as an economic device alto-
gether; he attacks the skullduggery, the evil influence which cap-
italism carries in its wake when its practice is abused.87 Even
83. Cf. R. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA (1930); see also R. POUND, supra
note 71, at 195.
84. Cf. supra note 65.
85. Brandeis, Industrial Democracy, in THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWS OF MR.
JusncE BRANDEIS 369 (A. Lief ed. 1930).
86. Brandeis stated:
The (the trusts) have crushed it (industrial liberty) out among large groups of our
people so completely, that it will require years to restore our industries to a condi-
tion of health. This social unrest is really what is the matter with business. Well-
founded unrest; reasoned unrest; but the manifestations of which are often unin-
telligent and sometimes criminal.
Id. at 394.
87. Compare Max Lerner's comment:
Justice Brandeis' animus, as has been noted above, is directed not at the normal
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though in judicial opinion he is ever solicitous of the cause of the
worker,88 his bias never draws him so far to the left that he is
unable to see the employer's point of view for the angle:8' his
efforts are directed toward keeping the balance even.' 0
Thus, Brandeis' preoccupation with class struggle distin-
guishes him at once from Pound. In method, however, their atti-
tudes coincide. The brief of Muller v. Oregon,'1 written by Bran-
deis must have sent Pound into an ecstasy of delight, for it
illustrated precisely his sociological approach to the law. Here
was no delicate structure of abstract legalistic theory to support
a statute, but the collation of impressive facts and statistics but-
tressing the legislature's ground for statutory reform. The brief
is a milestone in the development of realism in the law: as a
symbol, it far outweighs Pound's efforts toward reform, impor-
tant though they be. The method of Brandeis is indeed that of
Pound, but it gains in his hands the halo of an advocate's art.
Brandeis bases his argument on reality; as Beard says:
Above all he seeks to draw his jurisprudence out of the reali-
ties of life - its work, its economy, and its social arrangements.
For the copious citation of more or less dubious precedents, which
are seldom exactly apposite, he has little affection, preferring, it
seems, to substitute for the show of authority a display of stub-
born and irreducible facts knit closely together in a pattern of
thinking.92
Especially does Brandeis use his realistic approach in regard
to economic problems coming before the court; his strength as a
judge lies in his effective command over economic theory and
functioning of a capitalistic society but at its pathology. . . . There is an almost
idyllic freshness about the way in which he clings to the original content of eco-
nomic institutions whose current form most of the rest of us accept in a somewhat
jaded fashion.
Lerner, The Social Thought of Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Ms. JusTicE BRANDEIS, 35 (F.
Frankfurter ed. reprint 1972, original 1932).
88. See, e.g., Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
89. Compare Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917) with
American Column Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
90. Compare Pound's attitude. See Pound, supra note 68 at 345-47.
91. 208 U.S. 412, 415-16 (1908).
92. Beard, Introduction to THn SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC Vmws OF MR. JusTicE BRAN-
DEIS at xx (A. Lief ed. 1930).
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sociological material.9" It is this marshalling of the facts suppos-
edly underlying all juristic theory that sets Brandeis off from
Holmes in both the practice of a realistic, pragmatic approach to
the facts and in the sociological philosophy which he espouses.
Brandeis differs from Holmes almost precisely as Upton Sinclair
differed from Howells: in both law and literature, the contrast
between the two kinds of realism is thus rendered distinct.
The realism of Brandeis and Pound and of Norris and Sin-
clair possessed the common characteristic of reformist zeal. Re-
alism, both in literature and law, ceased to remain artistic the-
ory, and became a method of attack. At the same time the
tendency to treat law as a science remote from the hurly-burly
of life slowly disappeared, and a recognition of the kinship of all
the social sciences slowly grew; the novel simultaneously began
to draw its plots and characters from actual occurrences. The
marked resemblance in both legal and literary spheres lies in the
pronounced demand for thorough and careful study of the facts
out of which the legalistic or artistic situation arose. Of course,
this type of realism can hardly be considered pure "realism": an
impersonal setting-down of the facts under observation. Where
there is a thesis to be propounded, the prism of observation may
be affected by the bias: the wish may father the "reality.
9 4
IV
The World War terminated the second period of develop-
ment. For the length of six years, during the stress and abnor-
mal pressure on intellectual pursuits, literary and legal realism
remained in a suspended state. It is not until 1920 that a renas-
cence may be observed. To be sure, what a renascence it is! The
novelist is thrust into a world of disillusionment, into a dis-
torted, ravaged environment, into a society where pre-war ideals
and attitudes are totally bankrupt. F. Scott Fitzgerald at this
time wrote The Other Side of Paradises" and The Beautiful and
93. "Mr. Justice Brandeis' realism is chiefly economic: his thought evinces a mastery
of the facts and processes of economic life hitherto unsurpassed on the Court." Lerner,
supra note 87, at 25.
94. Id. at 23.
95. F. FITZGERALD, THE OTHER SIDE OF PARADISE (1920).
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Damned,"6 depicting the bewilderment of young people living in
a wearied and sickly world. The realism of Frank Norris before
his obsession with the social conflict of his era is once more re-
vived, approaching the impressionism of Stephen Crane,"7 but
presented in a barer and stripped form. The war novels depicted
scenes at once brutal and revolting, without a trace of sentimen-
tality to dilute the impersonal recounting. The blood, the terror,
the havoc wrought by the new methods of warfare are portrayed
unemotionally and without embroidery. 8 In a sense, realism
comes to resemble the old naturalism of Zola and Balzac. There
is the same note of despair, of complete cynicism in the fiction
of the early twenties, as if the novelist cried: what is truth, what
is loyalty, what is devotion in the face of what has happened in
the War? The fine faith of the liberal struggling for reform only
six or seven years before has been lost in the face of the terrible
results of large scale and mechanistic combat. The attitude is
strikingly summed up in the title of a book which has appeared
late in the period: Farewell to Reform.99
The debacle of pre-war ideals and criteria created for the
liberal an intellectual chaos. New standards perforce had to be
rebuilt; but since the previous standards had so dismally failed,
seemingly the new edifice could not be constructed on the lines,
or even on the foundations of the structure only then destroyed.
This spirit pervaded the literature of the 1920's: a spirit of ex-
perimenting, of searching, of probing anew. Gertrude Stein and
Ezra Pound in Paris became the nuclei of the most extreme
groups. Thus, Stein considered that words were not sufficient to
satisfy all the demands which the conveyance of meaning placed
upon them; she believed that words had implications in their
sound and in their use and position in a sentence, beyond their
usual intent. James Joyce sought to reproduce the thoughts of
characters in his fiction in their disjointed, obscure, and dis-
96. F. FITZGERALD, THE BEFuL AND THE DAmNED (1920).
97. The analogy gains significance when one notes the parallel free verse movement
sponsored by Amy Lowell, Carl Sandburg, and Harriet Monroe, which was definitely
impressionistic.
98. See, e.g., J. Dos PAssos, THREE SOLDIERS 1921; E.E. CUMMINGS, THE ENORMOUS
RooM (1922). Later manifestations of this may be seen in W. MARCH, COMPANY K (1956)
and E. HEMINGWAY, A FAEwRu To ARMS (1929).
99. J. CHAMBERLAIN, FAREwELL TO REFORM (1932).
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torted form. Throughout the literature of that day, the reckless
endeavor to describe moods by the aid of opposite word-phrases
was evident; the artists attempted to capture fleeting sensations
by the net of language; perhaps to expect words to convey more
than they can.100 While associated with Joyce and Stein in Paris,
Ernest Hemingway developed the terse, naked style which possi-
bly, as expression, conforms more closely to the realistic ideal
than any other created hitherto.10' John Dos Passos was another
of this exploring coterie; from his experiments in writing he dis-
tilled entirely unique and novel devices for fiction: "the camera
eye" - a subjective comment - and "the news-reel" - the so-
cial and political background.10 2 Perhaps these artists were more
prominent; other writers, not as prominent but fully as en-
grossed in experimental expression, filled the pages of the liter-
ary magazines with their work. But this movement was not re-
formist; rather, it was blind and purposeless, trying to raise from
the ashes of the old standards a satisfying new order. Indeed, in
Europe, one group, the Dadaists, with whom some Americans
were connected, made it their purpose to have no purpose: art,
they said, consisted in being artless.
Naturally, with the failure of standards, the morality of the
first part of the century collapsed as well. Sexual matters be-
came the subject of frank discussion; novels were written in this
time which would have been banned ten years previous. 03 Inter-
mingled with the candid treatment of sexual immorality, the
new Freudian psychology entered the pages of the new fiction.
Sexual perversion became a topic or a common explanation of
the actions of characters.'" Against the background of com-
plexes, neuroses, and psychopathology must be placed Watson's
behaviorism, since it amounted to the strictest realism, realism
100. Compare the later publication by Virginia Woolf. V. WOOLF, THE WAVES
(1931).
101. See, e.g., E. HEMINGWAY, MEN WITHOUT WOMEN (1927).
102. See, e.g., J. Dos PAssos, Nineteen Nineteen, in 2 U.S.A. (1930)
103. Cf. F. DELL, MOON-CALF (1920); G. ATHERTON, BLACK OXEN (1923); E. HEMING-
WAY, THE SUN ALSO RIsEs (1926).
104. Marcel Proust's vast novel, Remembrance of Things Past, written before this
period but not published and read in America until 1920 or thereafter, comes most
quickly to mind. Cf. R. HALL, THE WELL OF LoNELINEss (1928); E. O'NEILL, STRANGE
INTERLUDE (1928).
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bared to the bone.10 5 Together with the experimental novel, the
psychological novel had a wide and thought-provoking vogue.
Nor did the revolt against old standards cease here. Sinclair
Lewis in his novel Main Street0 6 headed the procession for a
series of novels embodying a profound and bitter criticism of
American life, particularly life in the American village.10 7 More-
over, the tendency to localize comment, to study, to analyze, to
criticize the people of one particular area characterized the new
realism after 1920. Novelists devoted their talents to one section:
thus, Ruth Suchow and Sinclair Lewis restricted themselves in
the main to the middle west; William Faulkner, Erskine Cald-
well, and Maristan Chapman to the hillbilly and poor-white
south; Eugene O'Neill, in his plays, to New England. In a sense,
these regional novels and plays were related to the studies of
psychologists, being large-scale case histories of the inhabitants
of a particular area.
The realistic novel, in brief, turned from a novel of sheer
propaganda as that of the Sinclair-Herrick type toward the
novel of Howells and Crane, but transcended their realism, since
no bar of reticence was recognized. In contrast, complete frank-
ness became both the ideal and the method. The novel had char-
acters, but usually no hero; many times the fiction was a narra-
tive without an apparent thesis -merely an individualistic
performance. The difference between these hero-less novels and
Sinclair's novels, where socialism (as a force) is the hero and
capitalism is the villain, rose to sharp distinction in the early
1920's. Thus, the pendulum had swung back and beyond. Realis-
tic fiction entered its third transition: a stage which extends to
the end of the period.
In the law, the same forces were present. Almost at the end
of the liberal-reformist era, the signs of a mode of thought at
variance with Pound had arisen. As early as 1912, Joseph Bing-
ham had embarked upon an inquiry as to "What is the Law?"' 8
105. An example of behaviorism can be seen in Hemingway's work. See supra note
101.
106. S. LEWIS, MAIN STREET (reprint 1946, original 1920).
107. Joined with this movement were the biographies "debunking" popular Ameri-
can heroes. See R. HUGHES & W. WOODWARD, GEORGE WASHINGTON - THE IMAGE AND
THE MAN (1926).
10S. Bingham, What is the Law?, 11 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1912) (Part I); id. at 109 (Part
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He considered that although the law might be thought of either
as a science or an art, it partook more of the nature of a practi-
cal science. 10 9 In this conception he differed not, of course, from
Pound; but he continued to say that he deplored the binding
force of precedents - a step a good deal further than Pound
had ever gone. 110 Indeed, he distrusted all generalization, all de-
ductions; he asked whether we should not embrace a philosophy
that places the emphasis on knowledge of the truth relating to
concrete phenomena which are relevant both to lawyers and lay-
men, and place generalizations and language in their proper per-
spective as the requisite tools to develop this knowledge.' This
approach was perhaps not too clear a manifestation of a chang-
ing attitude, but it was at least a straw in the wind.1 2
The new "legal realism" has appeared in the law reviews
from 1924 onward, with the movement blossoming into full
flower from 1928 to date. At the beginning of the movement the
term "legal realism" is first used as a description of the new phi-
losophy;"' Frank and Llewellyn lead the assault upon all that
has been accepted in the law without too great an examination.
It must be emphasized that no "school" of legal realists will be
found existing. As Llewellyn himself concedes, "There is no
school of realists. There is no likelihood that there will be such a
school. There is no group with an official or accepted, or even
with an emerging creed .... They are related, says Frank, only
in their negations, and in their skepticisms, and in their curios-
ity."''1 Tendencies alone exist; true, there is a certain common
core of beliefs which inhere in their writings, i.e., in (1) a recog-
nition of legal rules as means rather than ends in themselves; in
(2) the study of the process of decision in appellate courts; and
in (3) investigations into the actions of lower courts;" 5 but each
exponent has his peculiar, special theory. These men, however,
I).
109. Id. at 15 (Part I).
110. Id. at 112-14 n.33 (Part II).
111. Id. at 119 (Part 11).
112. Cf. Corbin, The Law and the Judge, 3 YALE L.J. 234 (1916).
113. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. Rav. 431
(1930).
114. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism - Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HAnv. L. Rsv. 1222, 1233-34 (1931). This is by far the best article on legal realism.
115. Id. at 1250.
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do not spring totally into print without the background of
Holmes and Pound. Holmes they expressly hail as their
leader;"' and though Pound attacks some of their premises, they
are more in accord with him than in disagreement.111 When
Pound describes the basic thought in their cause thus: "By real-
ism they mean fidelity to nature, accurate recording of things as
they are, as contrasted with things as they are imagined to be, or
wished to be. . . ,", they agree at once with the characteriza-
tion.119 In principle, they are doing exactly what Pound advo-
cates:120 they are studying in detail the mechanism of the law in
relation to the conditions existing in the market place.
Where their point of view diverges from Pound's, however,
it diverges widely, and it is on the divergence that an apprecia-
tion of their kind of realism rests. Pound is still the reformist;
what these realists are doing, he says, is merely portraying,
faithfully enough, perhaps, how courts act. But that is not suffi-
cient in his view: the test should not be Is, but Ought. In other
words, ethical considerations should motivate criticism. 2' To
this view, the new realists take immediate exception; more
likely, they reply, it is "[w]hen writers of realistic inclination are
writing in general, they are bound to stress the need of a more
accurate description, of Is and not of Ought. There lies the com-
mon ground of their thinking; there lies the area of new and
puzzling development."' 22 Moreover, as with Hemingway and
the modern fictional realists, the legal realist is disillusioned and
inclined toward skepticism, if not cynicism. Ideals and standards
are but of passing moment, for status and opinion equally
change. The parallel between Hemingway and Frank lies pre-
cisely in that common attitude. 1'
116. Llewellyn, supra note 24, at 704 n.*.
117. Pound assails the movement in his work, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence.
Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1931). His disciple
John Dickinson also declares against the new realists. Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their
Function in the Process of Decision, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 833 (1931) [hereinafter cited as
Dickinson]; Dickinson, The Law Behind Law, 29 COLUM L. REV. 113, 285 (1929).
118. Pound, supra note 117, at 697.
119. Llewellyn, supra note 114, at 1224.
120. Llewellyn, supra note 113, at 435 n.3.
121. Pound, supra note 117, at 700-03.
122. Llewellyn, supra note 114, at 1255.
123. There is a second group of critics which has assailed the realistic movement in
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The development of new methods of research and presenta-
tion has proceeded at almost as fast a pace as has occurred in
literary realism. Llewellyn's casebook on sales stands as a con-
spicuous example; 24  from his novel arrangement many
casebooks followed in tacit approval. In the matter of pedagog-
ics, somewhat of a revolution has occurred in the acceptance of
Llewellyn's theory of arranging legal materials according to
function rather than to the traditional divisions of causes of ac-
tion and legalistic concepts. Another telling parallel is the crea-
tion of a new technique to aid in research into the institutions of
society. Through the use of this technique of utilizing data accu-
mulated in field studies, the significance of trade customs and
the direct effect of the action of lower courts on the litigant and
lawyer have been the topic of a number of articles relying on
such data.ls2 These investigations, localized, covering a small
area intensively, represent for the legalist the provincialism in
literary realism which marks the work of William Faulkner and
Maristan Chapman.
Together with that technique is the inclination of the real-
ists to question minutely the value of legal rules and to analyze
the part that the judge plays in the judicial process. Llewellyn
thus queried the utility of the legalistic tool of the contract in
our society;12 6 a realistic judge in a burst of confidence confesses
that for him intuition and not cold analysis is often the motivat-
ing force behind a decision;"17 and one skeptic even suggests that
the judge's past life and upbringing, his present position in the
social scale, and his political and economic philosophy are fac-
tors influencing his decisions."' It is argued vigorously by the
the law, namely, the formal logicians. See Adler, Law and the Modern Mind: A Sympo-
sium, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 82, 91-108 (1931).
124. See Turner, Book Review, 30 COLUM. L. Rsv. 904 (1930) (reviewing K. LLEWEL-
LYN, CASES AND MATEIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES (1930)).
125. See Carey, Jr., Smith & Lansden, Studies in Foreclosure in Cook County, 1, 27
ILL. L. REv. 476 (1933); Moore & Hope, An Institutional Approach to the Law of Com-
mercial Banking, 38 YALE L.J. 703 (1929).
126. Llewellyn, supra note 24. Compare this with Patterson's view that legal realism
was similar to the philosophy behind the Restatement of the Law of Contracts. Patter-
son, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 33 COLUM. L. Rv. 397, 413 (1933).
127. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Ju-
dicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929).
128. Haines, Effects of Personal, Political and Economic Influence in the Decision
of Judges, 17 ILL. L. REv. 961 (1922).
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realist that precedents should be binding only as they are per-
suasive: that prior decisions should not be regarded as sacred.
The premise that law is not certain in its operation runs
throughout realistic writing; it is argued that between appellate
court theory and lower court decision there often exists a wide
and irreconcilable gap. These common beliefs evidence the skep-
ticism of the realists' outlook, and the sharpness of their attack
- surely as sharp on the complacency of the older legalistic the-
ory as were Sinclair Lewis' thrusts against mid-western culture
in Main Street.12 9
The free ventilation of sexual matters mirrored in contem-
porary literature is likewise reflected, though to a lesser degree,
in the writing of the legal realist.8 0 Behaviorism and the
Freudian psychology of the personality have been adapted and
rationalized to explain or to suggest the revision of legal rules,
particularly in the field of contract formation, "1 ' and as a
description of the factors underlying juristic ratiocination. 2 In-
deed, Jerome Frank ingeniously contends, after demonstrating
the lack of certainty in the law, that the reason men look to law
for certainty is on account of a psychological complex, a remnant
of the time the child looks to his father for authority. One day,
said Frank, the breach occurs: the child finds his father is not
the governor, the arbiter of the universe. The child carries, how-
ever, in growing to adulthood the longings for stability in an un-
certain world; this longing he fastens upon the law: it becomes
the father-substitute.
The trouble with legal thinking is not the mental inadequa-
cies of the lawyers. It is in the very nature of law, its role as a
father-substitute, that stirs up unconscious attitudes, concealed
desires, illusory ideals, which gets in the way of realistic observa-
tion of the workings and significance of law. s8
129. S. Lewis, MAIN STEMT (reprint 1946, original 1920).
130. See Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1281 (1932)
(Part I), 33 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1933) (Part II); May, Experiments in the Legal Control
of Sex Expression, 39 YALE L.J. 219 (1929).
131. Patterson, Equitable Relief for Unilateral Mistake, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 859,
S67-69 (1928).
132. Schroeder, The Psychologic Study of Judicial Opinions, 6 CALIF. L. REv. 89
(1918).
133. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 91 (1930). Note the introduction to this
work by J. Mack at page IX.
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Agreement may not have been forthcoming for Frank's analysis,
but the influence of Freudian psychology is apparent.
Less ponderable as an element in the realistic ferment in
the law is the intellectual stir over the theory of relativity devel-
oped by Einstein, and the new physics of Jeans and Eddington.
Several writers, notably Walter Wheeler Cook's4 and Hunting-
ton Cairns,'3 5 have suggested that the intellectual excitement
thus aroused created the controversy between the traditionalists,
or Bealists, to use Frank's term, and the realist. The possibility
of Einstein's theory affecting the law may seem rather remote.
But in respect to the new physics, a more direct inference to
legal realism may be drawn. Eddington and Jeans assert that the
universe is expanding. Surely certainty in all one considers se-
cure would be shaken; that shaken confidence may have led to
reflections over the oftstated certainty of the law.""
Throughout the development of legal realism there is visible
as a recurrent pattern the concept of pragmatism. The hand of
John Dewey appears in almost all the newer realistic writing in
the law. It may be remarked with Mortimer Adler (in speaking
of Frank's Law and the Modern Mind3 7), "It is no coincidence
that Mr. Frank's discussion of certainty in law should appear
roughly contemporaneous with John Dewey's Quest for Cer-
tainty [sic],"'3 s and that "[legal realism is a name for pragmatic
and empirical thinking about the law."'' 9 But we must not
transfer philosophical realism bodily into legal realism; as Pound
says, the legal realists use the term not in a philosophical but in
an artistic sense -a literary sense.4 It is not metaphysics the
legal realist is discussing; it is the law, and it is the experimental
134. Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 15 JOHNS HOPKINS ALUMNI MAG. 213,
224 (1927).
135. Cairns, Law and Anthropology, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 32 (1931); see also Dickin-
son, supra note 117; cf. Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 30 n.33 (1931).
136. Such explanation does not, of course, fit Holmes. Cf. supra note 35.
137. J. FRANK, supra note 133.
138. Adler, supra note 123, at 91 (citing J. DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINY
(1929)).
139. Adler, supra note 123, at 91.
140. Pound, supra note 117, at 697. Pound states: "As I read them, the new juristic
realists hardly use realism in a technical philosophical sense. They use it rather in the
sense which it bears in art." Id. Surely pure realism is wholly lacking where tests have
been observed; the results are the product of the reporting of what has been observed.
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method together with the emphasis on true observation that he
joins to law which put the stamp of realism upon his thought. " "
The third transition in the development of realism is, there-
fore, one of disillusionment, of skepticism. Both in legal and
fictional realism one discerns a return toward the primary real-
ism of Holmes and Howells, but by a more direct route; there is
no reluctance to face squarely, and, indeed, to make full use of,
the significance of the term. The rise of new devices to glean
startling effects, in the case of literature, or to obtain a deeper
understanding of the working of the juristic processes, in the
case of law, demonstrate the close parallelism that exists be-
tween these two cultural manifestations. Astonishing it is to ob-
serve the degree to which law and literature obey the influences
playing upon our society.14 2 The transformation in the attitude
of the lawyer in Holmes' period to the attitude of the lawyer of
the present day may be striking; 4 8 but surely it is not abrupt.
The course has been gradual, and considering the strength of
these influences tending toward the formation of cultural pat-
terns, even inevitable.
V
Conclusions are treacherous allies: the facts underlying their
deductions are so often many-faceted, suggesting implications at
every level. Moreover, a theory propounded may subtly twist the
facts to the desired degree of compliance with the conditions of
the theory, and thus the conclusions become the theory. These
141. Thus, whatever thinking Dewey has done in the strictly legal field is condi-
tioned by the law. See Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17 (1925). Cf.
supra note 35.
142. Even in 1933, the influences remarkably coincide. Thus, compare the leaning
toward collectivism with Max Lerner's article. Lerner, The Supreme Court and Ameri-
can Capitalism, 42 Ymiz L.J. 668 (1933) (a frank study of the effect of Marxism on our
highest Court). Compare, too, the shift of the financial center of the world from London
to New York in the 1920's, and the vigor of American fiction over English fiction, with
the emergence of legal realism as an American, as opposed to an English, movement. Cf.
V. CALVERTON, supra note 18, at 432-33.
143. Some conception of the change may be shown forcefully by the contrast be-
tween Holmes' theory of vested rights and Cook's opposing theory of local law, as expla-
nations for the court's behavior in conflict of laws situations. See Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914) (Holmes' theory); for Cook's theory, see Cook, The Logical
and Legal Bases of The Conflict of Law, 33 YALK L.J. 457 (1924).
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are dangers; yet they are dangers which must be accepted in any
study.
It would be banal simply to conclude that literature and law
have connections not slight, but close and concrete. It is more
significant to remark upon the similar effects of the force of real-
ism at parallel periods of time; that legal thinking, more formi-
dably than might be suspected, is moved by the course of cul-
tural movement.""' The engaging interest for the lawyer is the
method by which he may ascertain these elements in our culture
which in the future may flower into grounds for the revision of
rules, into new legal conceptions and into bases for new legal
theories. Certainly, as a means of sighting the lines of new move-
ments, fictional literature may be an easy and, in some in-
stances, perhaps the only resort for the lawyer who seeks to dis-
cern cultural movements.14 5 The literary artist is not entangled
in the mesh of doctrines which by its very presence stands for a
static world: in theory and practice he is independent from all
other and prior writing. Thus, because he is apt to be looking
forward as well as backward, the literary artist is equipped to
observe emerging forces more acutely than the lawyer. When
swift and tumultuous change is imminent, there is necessity for
a knowledge of the forces tending toward transformation, and
where transformation has already occurred, attack and defense
usually follow. 46
Only for the traditionalist is the law a subject of strict legal
inquiry. He does not concede that literature is of any aid to the
lawyer; the taint of the word "fiction," implying a whimsical dis-
tortion of reality to suit the author's will, in his mind infects its
value. This view is inescapably narrow; it sweeps outside of the
144. The exaggerated degree to which the cultural lag is said to exist in the law may
be queried. Consider the solitary positions of Holmes and Howells in their respective
fields during their advocacy of realism. To be sure, Howells attracted a greater propor-
tion of writers to his cause than Holmes attracted lawyers; it is scarcely debatable that
literary realism was much decried throughout the first years that Howells was its spon-
sor. Cf. Lerner, supra note 142.
145. This article does not touch upon other resources of literature upon which the
lawyer might draw, as in the use of style and form in opinion and brief, for instance. Cf.
Bachrach, Reflections on Brief-Writers, 27 ILL. L. Rzv. 374 (1932).
146. Cf. O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931); see also
Cox, Book Review, 40 YALE L.J. 670, 672 (1931) (reviewing J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MOD-
ERN MIND (1930)).
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law cultural material bearing upon the parties before the court;
as Frank says, "More than that, there deserves to be studied the
possible employment, throughout the field of law, of that
method of patient investigation, by disinterested experts, of the
facts, and background of individual cases now used by our more
enlightened juvenile courts and courts of domestic relations." 7
To see law as a fragment of our culture, to see it framed
against the cultural background, is hardly to belittle it; it rather
introduces into its discipline a greater perspective. This Holmes
saw clearly fifty years ago when he wrote:
For every fact leads to every other by the path of the air.
Only men do not yet see how, always. And your business as think-
ers is to make plainer the way from something to the whole of
things; to show the rational connection between your fact and the
frame of the universe .... To be the master of any branch of
knowledge, you must master those which lie next to it; and thus
to know anything you must know all. ' "
Under such a point of view, it is not all strange to find legal
realism and literary realism of the same parentage; instead, it
would be queer if they were not.
147. J. FRANK, supra note 133, at 146.
148. SPEECHES BY OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 23 (1891) (speech delivered February
17, 1886).
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